保卫美国国会大厦西侧陷入困境的入口的防暴队被暴力包围。在为约瑟夫·拜登总统就职典礼搭建的舞台上,暴徒们抬高了脚手架。他们向可能的警察投掷了所有可以拿到的东西:钢筋,胶合板,电动工具,甚至是他们冷冻造成额外损害的食品罐。
在警察面前,暴民正在发动正面攻击。它的成员用拳头和棒球棒击中军官。他们抓住军官腰间挂着的武器。他们释放了M-80鞭炮。警官们浸入了永无休止的鲜橙色熊浪中,窒息在刺鼻的烟气中,刺鼻的鼻孔使视线模糊不清。
<p>处于混乱状态的一名军官是一名退役老兵,他们认为暴徒是如此残酷,如此残酷,以至于他们似乎被甲基苯丙胺推波助澜。在他的左边,他看着一大块钢铁击中了一名同僚,他的眼睛上方冒出了一个喷泉。胡椒球在他肩上的空中撕裂,在他面前一个人的下巴上爆炸。充满化学刺激物的一轮暴乱'的脸张开。现在可以从脸颊上的洞中看到他的牙齿。鲜血喷涌而出,在建筑物周围的人行道上淤积。但是那个人一直来。</p><p>这位退役老兵被熊喷雾打了八次。他的海外经历"不是这样的"他说。 “什么都没有。"</p><p>在过去的几周中,ProPublica就袭击国会大厦问题采访了19位现任和前任美国国会大厦警察。继众议院议员在前总统唐纳德·特朗普的弹each审判的第一天展示的捍卫建筑物的警官戏剧性视频之后,采访提供了迄今为止最不寻常的战斗的最详尽的叙述。</p><p>1月6日的敌人是美国人:全国各地成千上万的人来到国会大厦,意图阻止国会证明他们认为是从特朗普手中偷走的选举。特朗普本人已敦促他们参加,极端主义右翼和民兵领导人呼吁暴力。</p><p>当天,许多官员第一次与记者交谈'的事件,几乎都是匿名的,以免受到报应。他们的讲话完全表明了他们对不良反应感到沮丧的深度。 ProPublica还获得了机密情报公告和以前未报告的计划文件。</p><p>综合起来,这些信息清楚地表明了领导,沟通和战术的失败如何使数百名军官的生命处于危险之中,并使暴动者危险地接近实现对国会议员的威胁。</p><p>在回答有关此故事的问题时,国会警察局发了一封一句话的电子邮件:“目前正在进行多辖区调查,为了保护这一程序,我们目前无法提供任何评论。"</p><p>采访还透露了军官'人们担心该部队在1月6日举行的“黑生命问题”示威游行与反对特朗普的抗议活动之间的差异,官员表示,国会大厦警察部队通常会认真计划抗议活动,即使他们被认为不太可能爆发暴力。官员表示,在乔治·弗洛伊德(George Floyd)被明尼阿波利斯(Minneapolis)警察杀害后,他们花了数周的时间工作12至16个小时,以制止骚乱-尽管情报表明抗议者没有太大危险。</p><p>“我们知道,什么也不会发生-实际上什么也没有,"一位直接了解黑生活问题示威游行计划的前官员说。 “回应是,'We don't trust the intel.'"</p><p>相比之下,对于大多数部队来说,1月6日就像其他任何一天一样开始。</p><p>“我们通常会掌握关于这些人的位置以及他们离国会大厦有多远的信息,"前国会大厦警察和工会领导人基思·麦克法登(Keith McFaden)说,骚乱发生后,他从部队退役。 “那天我们什么也没听到。"</p><p>对于在国会大厦形成第一道防线的防暴队成员'在1月6日位于较低的西阶露台上,信息不足可能无法带来更高的风险。</p><p>进入最激烈的叛乱斗争后,大约有二十名军官为国会议员争取安全的关键时间。在大约100分钟的令人心跳加速的分钟中,他们滑倒并滑过一块沾满鲜血和熊血的石表面,试图将自己的地面抵制成千上万的狂暴群众。</p><p>对他们中的许多人来说,好像没人管国会大厦 '的防御。他们在警察广播电台上听到的所有声音都是在急切地寻求帮助。</p><p>在某一时刻,这位退伍军人被迫从线路上跌跌撞撞,他的脸上覆盖着熊喷,几乎看不见或呼吸。</p><p>他来的时候,一股浪涌到了他的南部。人群推了几个自行车架。他意识到难以置信的事情发生了。他的球队失去了分队;暴民现在可以进入国会大厦了。除了退后,别无选择。警官们偶然发现鲜血和碎屑,直到他们被压在露台后部的石灰岩墙上。暴民使他们陷入困境。</p><p>军官们从僵局中抽了出来,发现一条通向大楼入口的狭窄楼梯。但是一次只能容纳一名军官。因此,当人群封闭时,他们轮流攀登它,尖叫淫秽并威胁谋杀。</p><p>“你这混蛋!" one shouted. “You'甚至没有美国人!"</p><p>等待着爬楼梯的退伍军人担心最坏的情况。 “这是他们'll find my body," he thought.</p><h3>
情报:“正常的他妈的日子"
</h3><p>On the morning of Jan. 4, members of a civil disturbance unit gathered in a briefing room. A small group of officers were shown a document from Capitol intelligence officials that projected as many as 20,000 people arriving in Washington that week. The crowd would include members of several militia and right-wing extremist groups, including the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo Bois and the white supremacist Patriot Front. Some were expected to be armed, according to one officer who attended the briefing. The document anticipated that there could be violence.</p><p>The officers weren't allowed to physically share the document with anyone else, but they relayed its substance to the rest of their squad in a separate meeting. Together, the unit members discussed possible scenarios and pored over a map of the Capitol and its surroundings to identify vulnerable areas that could erupt in conflict.</p><p>The iconic west front of the Capitol emerged as an obvious target. Donald Trump was going to speak at the Ellipse across from the White House; from there, it's a direct walk past the Washington Monument and the reflecting pool outside the Capitol to the western facade of the building. The riot squad knew that if the crowd was going to violently confront police, that's where it would probably happen.</p><p>But the intelligence the unit relied on to make that judgment was not widely shared within the department. Several officers assigned to other commands told ProPublica they received no warning whatsoever going into Jan. 6. “We went to work like it was a normal fucking day," one said.</p><p>“It was business as usual," said another, who has been on the force for more than 15 years. “The main thing we were told was to be on the lookout for counterdemonstrators."</p><p>The Capitol Police force is made up of four main divisions, each responsible for safeguarding its own section of the Capitol complex. But ProPublica learned that these divisions operate in silos, often out of sync with one another. On Jan. 6, their failure to coordinate led to disastrous results. One group of officers was left stranded, separated from their riot gear, which sat unused on a parked bus near the Capitol while unprotected officers endured beatings with metal pipes and flagpoles.</p><p>The officers said that in the past, weekly Capitol Police intelligence briefings had kept the force well-informed about potential security threats from upcoming events. But those briefings stopped years ago.</p><p>Several weeks before Jan. 6, many officers were ordered by their leadership to return their helmets because they were so old, the officers said. One officer told ProPublica he had received his helmet decades ago, and the padding was rotted out. Many said their helmets were never replaced. On the day of the riot, the department only had helmets available in medium size, one officer said. Many officers didn't have gas masks. Most hadn't received riot training in years.</p><p>“They've been asking about this for over 10 years — this kind of equipment, this kind of training," said one officer, who asked for anonymity out of concern for retribution. “We'我总是谈论大的."</p><p>McFaden, the officer who retired last month after more than two decades as a Capitol Police officer, said that the communication failure going into Jan. 6 was consistent with recent history.</p><p>As second-in-command at the Capitol Police union, McFaden said, he met with then-Chief Steven Sund and other leaders of the force every two weeks.</p><p>“We'd consistently ask them, for years, 'What are the contingency plans for upcoming events?'" McFaden told ProPublica. “We'd always get either a no response, or that things were in flux and it's a national security issue and we can't divulge that information at this time."</p><p>In the absence of communication from the upper ranks on how to prepare, officers turned to social media or to each other.</p><p>One officer said he first heard about the planned protest a week before, when a friend from another federal agency called him to say, as he recalled: “You all are gonna have your hands full next week. You got some mean boys coming up there." The officer was confused. “What do you mean?" he replied.</p><p>As the day drew nearer, the chatter became more tense. Twitter and Facebook were abuzz with hotel rooms filling up, and Trump supporters were pouring into Washington, <a href="//www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55592332">announcing</a> their plans to initiate a “civil war" or “revolution." On a well-trafficked pro-Trump forum, one of the <a href="//twitter.com/oneunderscore__/status/1359556631655309314/photo/1">most </a><a href="//twitter.com/oneunderscore__/status/1359556631655309314/photo/1">popular </a><a href="//twitter.com/oneunderscore__/status/1359556631655309314/photo/1">posts</a> from Jan. 5 said Congress “has a choice to make tomorrow": certify Trump's victory, or “get lynched by patriots."</p><p>Officers, particularly the younger ones, spent shifts glued to their phones, forwarding ominous posts to their sergeants.</p><p>Similar warnings reached the Capitol Police's intelligence division. ProPublica obtained a previously unreported 17-page Capitol Police operational plan that showed select officials were notified of “numerous social media posts" encouraging protesters to arrive armed.</p><p>The document, which is dated Jan. 5, also states that white supremacists and the Proud Boys were expected to attend the rally, along with “other extremist groups," including antifa, the left-wing movement that has clashed with far-right groups and drawn the ire of some Republicans. The plan called for “counter-sniper teams" on the Capitol dome and officers monitoring for concealed weapons, but did not discuss a potential breach of the Capitol.</p><p>Other intelligence reports reviewed by ProPublica reveal inconsistencies — a sign of internal confusion about how best to respond.</p><p>ProPublica also obtained four daily reports from the department's intelligence division that were shared widely among commanders of the force, spanning the dates Jan. 4 through Jan. 7. The documents make no mention of expected extremist groups or the possibility that demonstrators would be armed. Instead, they note simply that “folks could organize a demonstration on USCP grounds."</p><p>The intelligence reports provide a kind of threat scale that gauges the likelihood of arrests. The Jan. 6 rally was scored as “improbable," meaning it had a 20% to 45% chance of resulting in arrests. Two small anti-Trump counterdemonstrations organized by local left-wing and antifascist groups were assigned the same risk level.</p><p>Sund, who submitted his resignation as chief of the Capitol Police on Jan. 7, later said he had tried to call in the National Guard two days before the riot. He said the sergeants-at-arms — the House and Senate officials responsible for security of lawmakers — <a href="//www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sund-riot-national-guard/2021/01/10/fc2ce7d4-5384-11eb-a817-e5e7f8a406d6_story.html">denied his request</a>. Both officials have since resigned. Reached by phone, former House sergeant-at-arms Paul Irving declined to comment. Former Senate sergeant-at-arms Michael Stenger did not immediately respond to a message left by phone.</p><p>In an emailed response to questions for this story, Sund said he and other departmental leaders were not responsible for assigning risk levels to upcoming events, and that he is “not sure of the process" the Capitol Police intelligence division uses to assess risk. He said intelligence was shared with division commanders to pass along to their troops, and that he emailed the assistant and deputy chiefs on Jan. 5 to ensure officers knew what to expect the following day. Sund also said “the force did much more to prepare for the events of January 6 than we did to prepare for BLM demonstrations," including expanding the perimeter around the Capitol and coordinating support from Metropolitan police. He said any “breakdown in communication" on Jan. 6 was “surely the result of the extraordinary events of that day."</p><p>He also defended his actions in an <a href="//static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2021/02/Letter_to_Congressional_leaders_02012021.pdf">eight-page letter</a> to congressional leaders dated Feb. 1, saying, in essence, that he and his fellow leaders did the best they could with the information they had.</p><p>Sund said he ordered an “all hands on deck" response, meaning every available officer “would be working." He said he deployed about 250 specialized crowd control officers, “approximately four platoons" of which were outfitted in riot gear. He said that during the riot he urgently requested help from a variety of federal and local agencies. He added that the Capitol Police ordered more helmets and received about 100 of them on Jan. 4. But he acknowledged that “a number of systems broke down."</p><p>“I also wish we had had better intelligence and warnings as to the possibility of this type of military style armed insurrection," Sund wrote, pointing out that there was a shared responsibility across a number of agencies. “The entire intelligence community seems to have missed this."</p><h3>
暴动前夕:“如果发生什么事,那就找工作吧"
</h3><p>1月6日凌晨7点,该部门的一名官员'午夜的班次结束工作,在国会大厦附近上了车。已经有大批人走过去,挥舞着特朗普的旗帜。他坐在司机里'坐一分钟,看着。他叫了一个老同事,惊叹于人群。</p><p>该军官惊讶于他的上司让他下班。在去年夏天的“黑人生活问题”抗议期间,夜班经常被迫提供帮助。但是他没有'没听到老板的消息,所以他开车回家去马里兰州郊区睡觉。当他醒来时,他在电视上看到发生了什么事,然后跟随一辆未标记的警车,车上的灯闪烁,闪回。</p><p>同时,属于防暴队的警官正在进入该地区开始其转移。他们可以看到成群的人从国会大厦附近的铁路枢纽联合车站涌出。那天早上,街道上的人数也使他们感到震惊-似乎每到一个红灯,一百名示威者在他们面前越过。军官们忙着准备漫长的一天。</p><p>上午10点,当特朗普的支持者开始聚集聆听总统的讲话时,防暴小队在距国会大厦台阶仅数个街区的建筑物举行了点名。情报部门几乎没有什么可分享的。相反,防暴队'军士播放了在社交媒体上发现的片段:抗议者在全国各地城市开会的视频,准备开车去哥伦比亚特区。他们告诉军官,确保他们的防毒面具和口袋里有零食。</p><p>上士们没有上级的真正指示,试图使他们的部队做好心理准备。</p><p>“你们都开车进来,你们看到了我们所做的同样的事情,"据该小组成员称,其中一名中士告诉军官。 “如果发生什么事,"另一个指示,“只是找到工作。"</p><p>部队戴上防暴装备:头盔和防弹衣。盾牌被放置在国会大厦周围的战略区域,尽管一些官员后来表示无法到达。一名中士向军官发出了最后警告。 “如果进展顺利,那么我们'll laugh about it,"他告诉他们。 “但是如果情况恶化,'会改变你的生活,你'我永远不会忘记它。他们'我将谈论这个问题多年,甚至几年。"</p><p>防暴队的成员上车等候他们的命令。</p><p>一名军官坐在他的装备中,对在座人员的年龄范围感到震惊。 “人们有他们的小孩,2岁的婴儿和婴儿车,"他回忆道。一位有助行器的老妇向国会大厦倾斜:“每两步,她都必须停下来,屏住呼吸。"</p><p>大约一个小时后,广播响起:在国会大厦东南部的共和党全国委员会总部外发现了一枚可能的炸弹。国会大厦警察赶到现场。 </p><p>在公共汽车上,信息并没有引起恐慌。可疑包一直在山上被发现;通常它们是错误的警报。</p><p>然后另一个更紧急的电话响了。遇险人员的10-33码。一名警官被向后撞倒,踩了一下台阶就撞到了她的头。国会大厦西侧的外围已被破坏。</p><p>通常,公共汽车上的军士会等待命令。但是一个人snap住了。 “操,我们're going,"他说。公共汽车绕着国会大厦驶来,几乎停在停放的汽车和抗议者之间,后者阻挡了建筑物旁边的行驶。</p><p>意识到他们被有效地放逐后,中士们下令将防暴小队下车。他们开始在国会大厦外的广阔草坪上行走。</p><p>当警官们靠近时,他们意识到建筑物的下部'西边的露台仅由所谓的“软小队”保护,"几乎没有防护装备的军官穿着霓虹灯黄色外套和棒球帽。骚乱者试图拉开被称为“自行车架”的金属路障,"并用拳头敲击军官。距离大约150码,小队成员冲刺而死。</p><p>一旦他们到达较低的台阶,防暴军便在软小队的后面展开,将成员逐一踢出。防暴队在他们受到较少保护的同事面前成立:大约二十名军官试图在路障线后占据120英尺的空地。</p><p>望着购物中心和华盛顿纪念碑,小队意识到草已经消失了,被成千上万的人群挡住了。</p><h3>
进攻:“挑边"
</h3><p>At about 1 p.m., Trump gave a rousing speech to protesters, suggesting they head to the Capitol to protest the election certification. “We're going to walk down" to the Capitol, where they must “fight," he said.</p><p>“We're going to the Capitol," he told the increasingly agitated crowd of protesters. “We're going to try and give [Republicans] the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country."</p><p>Vice President Mike Pence had just arrived in the House Chamber. The lawmakers awaiting him still hadn't realized just how dire the situation was becoming.</p><p>To Sund, it was already clear that “the situation was deteriorating rapidly," he wrote in his letter. He requested support from a number of agencies, including the Secret Service, and asked the sergeants-at-arms to authorize the National Guard and declare a state of emergency. According to the letter, Sund recalled that Irving, the House sergeant-at-arms, said he “needed to run it up the chain of command."</p><p>Outside on the lower west terrace, the rioters had begun launching their offensive. At first, they pushed officers from across the bike racks, almost testing to see what they could get away with. Soon it became a fistfight. In what felt like minutes, it turned into an all-out brawl involving scores of armed rioters.</p><p>To the police on the line, it seemed like every time they shoved one protester back, three more surged ahead to take their place.</p><p>“Some of them, as they are holding a thin blue line flag, looked you dead in the eye and said, 'Pick a side,'" one officer told ProPublica.</p><p>One officer hit a demonstrator and watched a pistol pop out of the rioter's waistband. The officer picked the weapon up off the ground and, with no time or backup to initiate an arrest, put it in his pocket and continued fighting.</p><p>Plumes of tear gas billowed behind the police line. Officers were startled by the sight of department commanders joining their desperate troops to defend the Capitol.</p><p>Inspector Thomas Loyd, the man in charge of the department's Capitol Division, threw off his hat and raised his fists. Deputy Chief Eric Waldow waded into the crowd. With the build of a linebacker, he cut a menacing figure, throwing punches as the bear spray stained his white uniform orange.</p><p>The two are now revered by the department's rank and file, who complain that other leaders were missing in action. Waldow and Loyd referred ProPublica to the Capitol Police public information office, which declined to comment.</p><p>The only other high-ranking official who officers said they heard on the radio that day was Yogananda Pittman, the department's assistant chief for protective and intelligence operations. Multiple officers told ProPublica that Pittman addressed the troops only once on the radio, when she ordered that the Capitol be locked down. Loyd, the union said in a public <a href="//www.rollcall.com/2021/01/27/pushback-on-capitol-police-chief-testimony-continues"></a>statement in January, had already given the same order about an hour before.</p><p>Elsewhere, another riot squad was in even worse shape. These officers had been dispatched to help quell a group of protesters gathered near a monument west of the Capitol. But they had been instructed by their superior officers to leave their gear on a bus. Now they were separated from the bus, defenseless.</p><p>“They were holding back some protesters, with just bike racks," said McFaden. “Well, those bike racks actually were used as weapons against the officers. Who had the bright idea of sending a hard squad with no gear? ... The coordination was just not there."</p><p>McFaden said that one member of that squad was hit in the head by a bike rack and knocked unconscious.</p><p>As the battle raged, officers stationed away from the combat were still trying to figure out if they were authorized to respond. They heard calls on their radios for “all available units." But officers at fixed posts didn't know what that meant.</p><p>“How the fuck am I supposed to know if I'm available?" thought one officer, stationed at a perimeter post with no rioters in sight. The officer's supervisors didn't know either. The group decided to stay put: If they left, there was a chance their post could be overrun. They were stuck listening to their colleagues fight and cry for help over the radio.</p><p>McFaden was also stationed away from the rioters, tasked with guarding a parking garage on the Rayburn House Office Building's west side. From his post, he had a clear view of the battle on the west front, but he'd received orders to stay at the garage entrance. At 56 years old, he had worked for the Capitol Police House Division for more than 20 years. He was slated to retire in just a few weeks. Now he was watching, powerless, as flash-bang grenades went off in front of a building he was sworn to protect.</p><p>By this point, time had become a blur to the officers at the west front. But somewhere around 1:15 p.m., it felt for a moment like the cavalry arrived. Dozens of officers in black riot gear came over the wall on the south side of the terrace. Washington's Metropolitan Police Department, the only other members of law enforcement on the west front in riot gear that day, had arrived.</p><p>But the reinforcements could only slow the crowd. About an hour and a half after the Metropolitan police arrived, the rioters broke through the line. In the melee, a rioter was <a href="//youtu.be/esvuSWXncc8">captured on video</a> hurling a fire extinguisher at the Capitol police. It struck an officer in the head, giving him a concussion, according to his colleagues. That officer was one of at least two to be assaulted with such a device that day; another, Brian Sicknick, died from his injuries the following day.</p><p>The rioters pulled at least two of the Capitol Police officers in riot gear into the crowd, stealing their batons and pepper spray and setting off a kind of human tug of war, before other officers were eventually able to pull their colleagues out.</p><p>Soon, the police had their backs against a wall. They formed a semicircle, doing their best to defend themselves against jabs with flagpoles and shots from bear spray canisters and pepper spray guns.</p><p>The officers made their way toward the staircase leading up to the second floor of the west terrace. A line of officers pushed each other up the narrow steps. When they got to the terrace, they rushed through a door leading to the inside of the building. Metropolitan police formed a wall of riot shields behind them, sealing off the entrance.</p><p>The crowd never made it through the doors. Video footage shows a Metropolitan police officer trapped in the door, screaming in agony. As the police poured inside, some members of Congress were still on the House floor, yet to be evacuated.</p><p>At around this time, Sund was on a conference call with four different agencies and had just learned that he needed Pentagon approval to activate the National Guard. According to Sund's letter, Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt, the director of Army staff, remained skeptical. “I don't like the visual of the National Guard standing [in] a line with the Capitol in the background," Piatt said, suggesting that the guard relieve Capitol Police officers from their fixed posts instead. Piatt and the Department of Defense did not immediately respond to an emailed list of questions. (In a <a href="//thehill.com/policy/defense/533747-director-of-army-staff-disputes-capitol-police-chief-account-of-national-guard">statement </a>on Jan. 11, Piatt denied making such a comment. He later <a href="//www.cbs58.com/news/army-changes-account-of-key-phone-call-on-response-to-capitol-riot">acknowledged</a> that he “may" have said it.)</p><p>Once inside, the riot squad searched desperately for water. The pepper spray and bear spray cocktail was overwhelming, seeping through the tiny breathing holes of their masks.</p><p>Officers spat out phlegm and vomited into trash cans. When they eventually found water, they rushed to wash the chemicals out of their eyes and put their helmets back on. They climbed up another flight of stairs to get to the Capitol crypt, the circular room directly beneath the rotunda.</p><p>As the officers ascended, they met more rioters, who were being pushed down the stairs by Metropolitan police. The Capitol police felt like they were swimming upstream through a mob, grabbing the protesters by their limbs and shoulders as they tried to reach the next level of the Capitol.</p><p>One officer said the crypt looked like something out of a Michael Bay movie, trash strewn everywhere, the air thick with smoke.</p><p>After the crypt was cleared, another officer made it to the Capitol rotunda. He said he still can't shake the scene: On the walls, a 19th-century frieze depicted the Battle of Lexington and the signing of the Declaration of Independence; on the ground, pepper balls whizzed into the crowd and the smell of chemicals wafted through the air.</p><p>McFaden, too, finally got a call to jump into the action, and was ordered to the rotunda. When he arrived beneath its domed ceiling, already breathless from the run over, he got hit in the face with bear spray.</p><p>“I felt like you could fry an egg on my forehead," he said.</p><h3>
后果:“我不't信任我之上的人们做出让我安全回家的决定"
</h3><p>By about 4 p.m., other agencies had arrived in the rotunda: FBI SWAT teams, police officers from surrounding counties. Law enforcement moved in lines two or three deep, pushing the demonstrators out of the building's east doors.</p><p>With their guns drawn, officers teamed up and began searching the Capitol, clearing rooms one by one. Members of Congress were now huddled with their staff, cowering petrified behind furniture they had piled against their office doors.</p><p>The first 150 or so members of the National Guard finally arrived at 5:40 p.m.</p><p>“I still cannot fathom why in the midst of an armed insurrection, which was broadcast worldwide on television, it took the Department of Defense over three hours to approve an urgent request for National Guard support," Sund wrote in his letter. In response to questions for this story, the National Guard sent a <a href="//media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002563151/-1/-1/0/PLANNING-AND-EXECUTION-TIMELINE-FOR-THE-NATIONAL-GUARDS-INVOLVEMENT-IN-THE-JANUARY-6-2021-VIOLENT-ATTACK-AT-THE-US-CAPITOL.PDF">timeline</a> that confirmed their 5:40 p.m. arrival and referred ProPublica to a <a href="//www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2466547/on-behalf-of-the-us-army-statement-on-the-national-guard-response-in-the-distri"></a>press release stating they worked with Capitol and Metropolitan police “to assist with an immediate response."</p><p>At around 8 p.m., Capitol Police declared the complex secure. It was pitch-black outside by the time the riot squad that fought on the west front reunited. There was little conversation. They sat exhausted on the steps by the Memorial Door, helmets at their feet, staring at each other in disbelief. Some hugged each other. Others cried.</p><p>One saw that he had missed 17 calls and nearly 100 text messages. High school friends he hadn't spoken to in years reached out on Instagram. In text after text, the same words: “I saw the news." “Call me when you get this." “I love you."</p><p>The messages made some of the news coverage that came later, in which police were accused of siding with the mob, easier to stomach. He knew nothing he had done that day could be construed as complicit with the rioters. It looked like at least some of his friends and relatives knew it too.</p><p>Several officers said they didn't get home until the early morning hours of the next day. One said when he got home he went straight to his washing machine to put his bear-spray-soaked uniform into a cold-water wash. Another said that he could not get rid of the smell or the itch of the chemicals for days.</p><p>For a week afterward, one officer said, he cried nightly. Three Capitol Police officers died in early January: Brian Sicknick, who was beaten over the head with a fire extinguisher; Howard Liebengood, who died by suicide following the riot; and Eric Marshall, who died of cancer four days before the riot. Almost 140 Capitol and Metropolitan police officers were injured, according to a union statement. One had two cracked ribs and two smashed spinal discs.</p><p>A week or so later, McFaden and union chair Gus Papathanasiou met with leadership for the first time since Sund's resignation on Jan. 7. Acting Chief Pittman, Assistant Chief Chad Thomas and other senior officers were in attendance.</p><p>Loyd, the inspector who had thrown punches on the west front, was also there. McFaden had the sense that Loyd was only brought in to defuse tension with the union, which had more questions than leadership had answers.</p><p>Pittman acknowledged that the force was in a dark place and a culture change was sorely needed. But McFaden said the acting chief quickly became taciturn. When she was asked where she and her fellow chiefs were during the riot and why they weren't on the radio, she dodged the question.</p><p>Meetings with union leadership usually last at least an hour, but after 30 minutes, McFaden said, Pittman got up to leave for another engagement.</p><p>The union leaders were enraged. They turned to Thomas and asked why he wasn't on the radio that day.</p><p>“He said he was trying to do that for like 10 to 15 seconds, and he couldn't get on the radio," McFaden said. “This event lasted for hours. ... I mean, come on." Pittman and Thomas did not respond to calls for comment.</p><p>It was only through Pittman's testimony at a closed Congressional briefing on Jan. 26 that most Capitol Police officers learned that the force did in fact have intelligence warnings of possible violence. She admitted that the department failed to adequately act on it.</p><p>The officers said they are still waiting for an apology. Many are looking for new jobs.</p><p>“Let's face it. Now the whole world knows where the vulnerabilities of the Capitol are," said one officer. “I don't trust the people above me to make decisions to bring me home safe."</p></div><script async="" src="http://pixel.propublica.org/pixel.js" type="text/javascript"></script>
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